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I. Introduction
One of the most basic and widely accepted principles of
political governance is that that the state is justified in
promulgating laws to protect individuals from harm by others.1
The state’s power to legislate and protect against a variety of
* Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis,
MN. Teresa Stanton Collett, Fetal Pain Legislation: Is It Viable?, 30 PEPP. L.
REV. 161 (2003).
1. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“[A]ll
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . .”).
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harms, including the harm of being made to suffer physical pain,
has been recognized in both domestic2 and international law.3
“The Government of course has an obligation to protect its
citizens from harm.”4 The exercise of this power is up to the
prudential judgment of our state and national legislatures,
however, and is not a constant constitutional imperative.5
This power of protection encompasses all living creatures,6 as
well as developing fetal human life.7 Thirteen states and the
House of Representatives have passed legislation that strictly
limits abortions during the second half of the pregnancy,
generally after nineteen weeks gestation,8 to protect the
developing human person from pain.9 These laws, known as Pain2. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2012) (criminalizing and defining torture as
“an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended
to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or
suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody
or physical control”).
3. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85,
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a94.html (“Each State
Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures
to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”).
4. Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961).
5. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
195 (1989) (rejecting a claim against local child-protection officials who, after
notice of possible abuse, failed to protect a child from beatings by his father that
left the child severely brain damaged).
6. See HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BRIEF SUMMARIES OF
FEDERAL ANIMAL PROTECTION STATUTES (2009), http://www.animallaw.info/
articles/art_pdf/aruscohen2009fedlawsummaries.pdf (listing federal animal
protection statutes and providing an overview of each).
7. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992)
(recognizing the state’s potentially paramount interest in protecting fetal life
without limitation to Roe’s trimester categories).
8. ALA. CODE § 26-23B-5(a) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1304(a) (2012);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2159(b) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141(c)(1)
(2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-505 (2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1(a) (2012);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6724(c)(2) (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.30.1(E)(1)
(2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-3,106 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-45.1 (2012);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-05.3(3) (2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-745.5(A)
(2012); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.044 (2013); Pain-Capable
Unborn Child Protection Act, H.R. 1797, 113th Cong. (2013).
9. See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724,
735–36 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (upholding a South Dakota law requiring that
women be informed that abortion ends the “life of a whole, separate, unique,
living human being,” and finding that opponents of the definition provided “no
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Capable Child Protection Acts, strictly limit abortion after the
point of gestation when the unborn child has developed the
capacity to feel pain during the process of an abortion.10
Proponents argue that protecting an unborn child from such
pain is a natural extension of the long tradition in American law
prohibiting acts that inflict unwarranted suffering on human
beings and other sentient creatures.11 Opponents argue that such
laws are based on scientific speculation and inflammatory
rhetoric.12 Given the large number of states adopting PainCapable Child Protection Acts, it is no surprise that these
arguments are now before federal courts. This Article explores
the arguments supporting the existence of fetal pain and the
constitutionality of abortion limits at twenty weeks gestation.
II. Fetal Pain and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
The question of whether and when the unborn child feels
pain is not new. Since the early 1980s, there has been extensive
evidence to the oppose that conclusion”).
10. See David F. Forte, Life, Heartbeat, Birth: A Medical Basis for Reform,
74 OHIO ST. L.J. 121, 134 (2013) (“[S]tates have passed a version of the PainCapable Unborn Child Protection Act. The Act prohibits abortion after twenty
weeks of pregnancy based on the State’s assessment of medical evidence that
the unborn child could experience pain as early as twenty weeks.” (footnotes
omitted)).
11. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Fetal Pain Legislation: Is It Viable?, 30
PEPP. L. REV. 161, 171 (2003) [hereinafter Collett, Fetal Pain Legislation]
(discussing the history of abortion laws enacted to “minimize fetal suffering”);
Katherine E. Engelman, Fetal Pain Legislation: Protection Against Pain Is Not
an Undue Burden, 10 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 279, 312 (2007) (explaining that
the government “also regulate[s] the pain inflicted on other sentient creatures
such as laboratory animals and livestock”); Kevin Walsh, Note, The Science,
Law and Politics of Fetal Pain, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2031–32 (2002) (noting
other areas of law, specifically animal cruelty, where reform occurred to prevent
other sentient beings from suffering).
12. See, e.g., Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion:
Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
111, 152 (2008) (“Statements about fetal pain currently in place in several states
are questionably accurate and clearly misleading.”); Lindsay J. Calhoun,
Comment, The Painless Truth: Challenging Fetal Pain-Based Abortion Bans, 87
TUL. L. REV. 141, 151 (2012) (“[A]s detractors have noted, the language of the
legislative findings is extremely misleading with regard to medical support and
certainty.” (footnote omitted)).
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debate about whether the unborn experience pain during
abortion.13 President Reagan brought this issue squarely into
public view in 1984 when he said, “when the lives of the unborn
are snuffed out [by abortion], they often feel pain, pain that is
long and agonizing.”14 This debate reemerged and intensified
when the world caught a glimpse of life within the womb through
the picture of Samuel Armas’s tiny hand apparently grasping the
finger of his perinatal surgeon who was repairing Samuel’s spine
when he was only twenty-one weeks in gestation.15
The debate over fetal pain made its way into the courts after
the passage of state and federal bans of a procedure commonly
known as “partial-birth abortion.”16 In ruling on the
constitutionality of the federal ban, Judge Richard C. Casey,
sitting in the Southern District of New York, called the procedure
“gruesome, brutal, barbaric, and uncivilized.”17 He found that
13. See Engelman, supra note 11, at 281 (discussing the debate about fetal
pain).
14. Ronald Reagan, U.S. President, Address to the National Religious
Broadcasters Convention (Jan. 30, 1984), available at http://www.american
rhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreagannrbroadcasters.htm; see also John T.
Noonan, Jr., The Experience of Pain by the Unborn, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
HUMAN ABORTION 205, 205 (Thomas W. Hilgers et al. eds., 1981) (“One aspect of
the abortion question which has not been adequately investigated is the pain
experienced by the object of an abortion.”); Cristine Russell, Physician Group
Supports President on Fetus Pain: Human Nervous System Early Development
in Life, Group of Abortion Opponents Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1984, at A6
(“Twenty-six physicians wrote President Reagan yesterday in support of his
recent statement that fetuses often suffer ‘long and agonizing’ pain during
abortion.”).
15. History or Hoax, MICHAEL CLANCY, http://www.michaelclancy.com/
index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014) (discussing the photograph of Samuel
Armas and providing the famous photograph) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
16.
The federal partial-birth abortion ban prohibits a physician from
deliberately and intentionally vaginally deliver[ing] a living fetus
until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is
outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation,
any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the
mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person
knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus.
18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A) (2012); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 142
(2007) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1531).
17. Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 479 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
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abortion procedures “subject fetuses to severe pain.”18 In contrast,
Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton of the Northern District of California
arrived at a different conclusion. She wrote that “much of the
debate on this issue is based on speculation and inference”19 and
that “the issue of whether fetuses feel pain is unsettled in the
scientific community.”20 These divergent conclusions illustrate
the key factual battle involved in challenges to Pain-Capable
Child Protection Acts—when does the unborn child develop the
capacity to feel pain?
III. Defining Our Terms
Before attempting to answer the questions of “whether” and
“when” an unborn child or human fetus “feels pain,” it is
necessary to establish what the words “feels” and “pain” mean in
this context.21 Much of the disagreement on the existence and
extent of the unborn child’s pain can be explained by the absence
of a common definition of these key terms. There are three
competing definitions of “fetal pain” arising from whether “feels”
means to have a “conscious appreciation of” or merely
“experience,” and from the question of how such appreciation or
experience can be ascertained.
A. Conscious Appreciation
Some physicians and scientists restrictively define “feels” to
mean only those responses that reflect some self-awareness or
“conscious appreciation of pain.”22 “Pain is a subjective sensory
18. Id.
19. Planned Parenthood Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 997 (N.D.
Cal. 2004).
20. Id. at 1002.
21. Adrian R. Lloyd-Thomas & Maria Fitzgerald, Reflex Responses Do Not
Necessarily Signify Pain, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 797, 797 (1996), available at
http://www.bmj.com/content/313/7060/797.
22. See Stuart W.G. Derbyshire, Can Fetuses Feel Pain?, 332 BRIT. MED. J.
909, 911 (2006), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC
1440624/ (“Without consciousness there can be nociception but there cannot be
pain.”); David James Mellor et al., Fetal “Awareness” and “Pain”: What
Precautions Should Be Taken to Safeguard Fetal Welfare During Experiments?,
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and emotional experience that requires the presence of
consciousness to permit recognition of a stimulus as
unpleasant.”23 In the absence of consciousness, they argue that
the most researchers can conclude from the medical and scientific
evidence is that the human fetus “reacts to physical
stimulation.”24
Whether the fetus feels pain, however, hinges not on its
biological development but on its conscious development.
Unless it can be shown that the fetus has a conscious
appreciation of pain after 26 weeks, then the responses to
noxious stimulation must still essentially be reflex, exactly as
before 26 weeks.25
SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS ON ALTERNATIVES & ANIMAL USE LIFE SCI. PROC., Mar.
31, 2008, at 79, 80, available at http://www.slideshare.net/ SDRTL/fetalawareness-and-pain (“For a living animal to experience pain and to suffer as a
result it must . . . have a nervous system that is sophisticated enough . . . . [and]
[i]t must be conscious—an animal cannot suffer while it is unconscious.”);
Zbigniew Szawarski, Probably No Pain in the Absence of “Self”, 313 BRIT. MED.
J. 796, 796 (1996), available at http://www.bmj.com/content/313/7060/796.2
(“Thus pain has a dual nature. As a subjective, conscious feeling it is always my
pain happening inside or on my body and nobody else can experience it.”).
23. Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review
of the Evidence, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 947, 948 (2005), available at
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=201429; see also Carlo
Valerio Bellieni & Giuseppe Buonocore, Is Fetal Pain a Real Evidence?, 25 J.
MATERNAL-FETAL & NEONATAL MED. 1203, 1205 (2012) (“Our data show that
there is consistent evidence of the possibility for the fetus to experience pain in
the third trimester, and this evidence is weaker before this date and null in the
first half of pregnancy.”); ROYAL COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNAECOLOGISTS,
FETAL AWARENESS: REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE
11 (2010) [hereinafter FETAL AWARENESS], http://www.rcog.org.uk/files/rcogcorp/RCOGFetalAwarenessWPR0610.pdf (“The lack of cortical connections
before 24 weeks . . . implies that pain is not possible until after 24 weeks. Even
after 24 weeks, there is continuing development and elaboration of intracortical
networks.”).
24. See Hugh Muir, When Does Pain Begin?, THE DAILY TEL., Sept. 28,
1996, at 8
Groups such as the Birth Control Trust, whose director Ann Furedi
co-wrote one of the papers, admit that the foetus reacts to physical
stimulation, such as procedures involving needles, from around 12 to
14 weeks. They agree that stress levels can rise in these
circumstances. But they argue that the mere reaction to physical
stimuli does not automatically indicate the feeling of pain.
See also Lee et al., supra note 23, at 947 (“[P]ain perception probably does not
function before the third trimester.”).
25. Stuart Derbyshire & Ann Furedi, “Fetal Pain” Is a Misnomer, 313 BRIT.
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This reasoning was embraced by the federal district court in
Women’s Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich.26 The court
concluded that the state could not justify a ban on partial-birth
abortion, as preventing unnecessary cruelty to the fetus, due to
the absence of medical testimony that the fetus “experiences a
conscious awareness of pain.”27 In essence, the court reasoned
that absent evidence that the fetus had “mindful awareness” of
noxious stimuli,28 there can be no pain, and in the absence of
pain, there can be no cruelty.29
MED. J. 795, 795 (1996), available at http://www.bmj.com/content/313/
7060/795.2; see also FETAL AWARENESS, supra note 23, at 11 (“[T]he cortex is
necessary for pain perception; cortical activation correlates strongly with pain
experience and an absence of cortical activity generally indicates an absence of
pain experience. The lack of cortical connections before 24 weeks, therefore,
implies that pain is not possible until after 24 weeks.”).
26. See Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1074
(S.D. Ohio 1995) (“Until medical science advances to a point at which the
determination of when a fetus becomes ‘conscious’ can be made within a
reasonable degree of certainty, neither doctors nor judges nor legislators can
definitively state . . . when the fetus becomes aware of pain.”).
27. Id. In Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), Justice Kennedy
provided a layperson’s description of partial-birth abortion or the D & X
procedure:
In the D & X, the abortionist initiates the woman’s natural delivery
process by causing the cervix of the woman to be dilated, sometimes
over a sequence of days. The fetus’ arms and legs are delivered
outside the uterus while the fetus is alive; witnesses to the procedure
report seeing the body of the fetus moving outside the woman’s body.
At this point, the abortion procedure has the appearance of a live
birth . . . . With only the head of the fetus remaining in utero, the
abortionist tears open the skull. According to Dr. Martin Haskell, a
leading proponent of the procedure, the appropriate instrument to be
used at this stage of the abortion is a pair of scissors. Witnesses
report observing the portion of the fetus outside the woman react to
the skull penetration. The abortionist then inserts a suction tube and
vacuums out the developing brain and other matter found within the
skull. The process of making the size of the fetus’ head smaller is
given the clinically neutral term “reduction procedure.” Brain death
does not occur until after the skull invasion, and, according to Dr.
Carhart, the heart of the fetus may continue to beat for minutes after
the contents of the skull are vacuumed out. The abortionist next
completes the delivery of a dead fetus, intact except for the damage to
the head and the missing contents of the skull.
Id. at 959–60 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
28. Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp., 911 F. Supp. at 1073.
29. Id. at 1074; see also Interview by Bob Abernethy with Peter Singer,
Professor, Princeton Univ., in Religion & Ethics Newsweekly (PBS television
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B. Behavioral and Physiological Responses

Other physicians and scientists have rejected the
requirement of consciousness as a predicate to the experience of
pain. These doctors argue that observed physiological30 and
behavioral responses31 to noxious stimuli are reliable indicators of
pain, particularly for those individuals who are not capable of the
self-reporting.32 Even those who deny the existence of fetal pain
prior to self-consciousness concede unborn children respond to
painful stimuli at or before eighteen weeks of gestation:
It is known that the fetus withdraws from a needle from about
18 weeks and also launches a stress response following needle
puncture. The stress response includes the release of
hormones and neurotransmitters dependent on activity in
areas of the midbrain. These findings confirm that signals
about tissue damage are transmitted from the spinal cord and
brainstem to the midbrain from at least 18 weeks.33

Physicians and scientists recognizing the existence of fetal
pain prior to viability argue that absent the ability to self-report,
physical evidence of pain-like responses should be viewed as
“infantile forms of self-report and should not be discounted as
‘surrogate measures’ of pain.”34 While conceding the lack of
broadcast Sept. 10, 1999) (“Killing a newborn baby—whether able-bodied or
not—I think, is never equivalent to killing a being who wants to go on living. It’s
different. It’s still—almost always wrong, but it’s different.”).
30. Physiological changes include changes in heart rate or the increased
production of stress hormones. PARLIAMENTARY OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., FETAL
AWARENESS 3 (1997), available at http://www.parliament.uk/business/publica
tions/research/briefing-papers/POST-PN-94/fetal-awarenesspost-note94.
31. Behavioral changes include withdrawal of affected body parts, crying,
and facial expressions. Id.
32. See K.J.S. Anand & Kenneth D. Craig, Editorial: New Perspectives on
the Definition of Pain, 67 PAIN 3, 3 (1996) (stating that “[b]ecause self-report
may be absent or a faulty source of inference, nonverbal behavioral information
is often needed and used for pain assessment”); Am. Acad. of Pediatrics et al.,
Prevention and Management of Pain in the Neonate: An Update, 118 PEDIATRICS
2231, 2231–32 (2006), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/
content/118/5/2231.full.html (noting long-term adverse effects of pain on
development of neonates).
33. FETAL AWARENESS, supra note 23, at 5.
34. Anand & Craig, supra note 32, at 5; see also Vivette Glover & Nicholas
Fisk, We Don’t Know Better; Better to Err on the Safe Side from Mid-gestation,
313 BRIT. MED. J. 796, 796 (1996) (arguing that fetal stress responses may be
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perfect correspondence between behavioral and physiological
indicia and the actual experience of pain, these physicians and
scientists note that self-reports of pain and the actual experience
of pain also lack a perfect correspondence.35 They argue that the
burden of proof is on those who deny the existence of fetal pain in
the face of the physical evidence, rather than upon those who
seek to respond to the evidence by attempting to alleviate pain.36
C. Neurological Development37
Those subscribing to the view that fetal pain should be
presumed in cases involving physiological and behavioral
responses regularly refer to the development of the fetal nervous
system to reinforce their argument. The spinal cord and brain
develop within the human embryo’s neural tube, which forms
within the first two or three weeks of gestation.38 Within the first
the best indices of pain currently available).
35. See Anand & Craig, supra note 32, at 3 (describing self-reports as a
“faulty source of inference”).
36. See Mark Owens, Pain in Infancy: Conceptual and Methodological
Issues, 20 PAIN 213, 215 (1984)
If the assumption that infants experience pain is correct, then the
benefits are measured by a decrease in needless human suffering. The
cost of a mistaken assumption of infant pain would be to waste the
effort. Costs and benefits come down squarely on the side of assuming
that infants do experience pain. The burden of proof should be shifted
to those who maintain that infants do not feel pain.
See also Sampsa Vanhatalo & Onno van Nieuwenhuizen, Fetal Pain?, 22 BRAIN
& DEV. 145, 149 (2000) (stating that the proper response to evidence of fetal
response to noxious stimuli is to avoid or treat any possibly noxious stimuli
rather than speculate on the possible emotional experiences of pain by the fetus
or neonate); John Wyatt, When Do We Begin to Feel the Pain?, GUARDIAN, Oct.
24, 1996, at 2
While responsible scientists have a duty to emphasise what they don’t
know, doctors have a duty of care that should lead them to err on the
side of caution. If there is a possibility of lasting harm, we must act in
the best interests of our patients even when the evidence is
ambiguous. We should, in the words of Glover [a clinical scientist in
the psychobiology group at Queen Charlotte’s and Chelsea Hospital in
London], ‘give the foetus the benefit of the doubt,’ and extend the use
of effective pain relief to surgical procedures before birth.
37. The language and content of Part III.C draw substantially from Collett,
Fetal Pain Legislation, supra note 11, at 165–68.
38. PARLIAMENTARY OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., supra note 30, at 2.
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four weeks following conception, the primitive structures of the
brain are recognizable.39 The internal structure of the brain
continues to develop throughout the pregnancy and during the
first year of infancy into a complex structure that regulates many
distinct physical processes.40
In addition to the brain and spinal cord, the human nervous
system consists of an intricate network of peripheral receptors
and transmitters.41 The receptors specifically involved in
discerning pain are called nociceptors.42 Nociceptors are naked
nerve endings that lie free in the skin, with their cell bodies in
the dorsal root ganglia.43 They respond to pressure stimuli,
thermal stimuli, and chemical stimuli, and transmit their sensory
signals through the spinal cord to the brain via cutaneous nerve
fibers.44 The network of nociceptors and fibers develops in the
period from seven to twenty weeks’ gestation, beginning in the
skin of the face, then to the palms of the hands and soles of the
feet, until it covers the entire body.45 The fibers link to the central
nervous system through a network of synapse-like connections to
the cells of the fetal dorsal horn in the spinal cord.46 Neural and
chemical connections transmit the impulses received by the
dorsal horn to the brain.47
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See FETAL AWARENESS, supra note 23, at 3–4 (“Nociceptors are sensory
nerve terminals found in the skin and internal organs that convert tissue
damage into electrical signals. The pattern and strength of these nociceptor
signals is the first determining step in generating pain.”).
43. J.A. Rushford, Pain Perception, in FETAL & NEONATAL NEUROLOGY &
NEUROSURGERY 601, 601 (Malcolm I. Levine & Richard J. Lilford, Sr. eds., 2d ed.
1995).
44. See id. (“Two types of dermal nociceptor exist: high threshold
mechanoreceptors (HTMs), which respond to pressure and transmit impulses
. . . and polymodal receptors (PMNs), which respond to pressure, thermal and
chemical stimuli.”).
45. K.J.S. Anand & D.B. Carr, The Neuroanatomy, Neuophysiology, and
Neurochemistry of Pain, Stress and Analgesia in Newborns and Children, 36
PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 795, 798 (1989); Roland Brusseau, Developmental
Perpectives: Is the Fetus Conscious?, 46 INT’L ANESTHESIOLOGY CLINICS 11, 14
(2008); Vanhatalo & Nieuwenhuizen, supra note 36, at 146.
46. Rushford, supra note 43, at 602.
47. K.J.S. Anand & P.J. McGrath, The Applied Physiology of Pain, in PAIN
IN NEONATES 39, 40 (1993).
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As the brain receives the impulses, they enter the
thalamus.48 The thalamus registers the impulse and, if it
identifies the impulse as one of organic pain, this portion of the
brain sends physiological signals to the motor nerves to initiate
the body’s complex reflexive response to pain.49 After
interconnection, the thalamus can also transmit the initial
impulse to the cortex of the brain, where complex processing,
including psychological reaction and directed physical responses,
takes place.50 Although both the thalamus and cortex are
recognizable in the basic brain structure from about six weeks’
gestation,51 they continue to grow in size and internal structure
throughout the pregnancy.52 The thalamus, however, develops
and interconnects with the nervous system much earlier than the
cortex.53 By twelve weeks of gestation, the thalamus is mature
enough to receive impulses from the sensory network.54 Only at
or beyond twenty weeks is the interconnection between the
thalamus and the cortex sufficiently developed for the cortex to
receive the impulses transmitted from the network via the
thalamus.55
From a neurological development perspective, the key to
answering the question of whether fetuses experience pain
48.
49.

Id.
See RICHARD S. SNELL, CLINICAL NEUROANATOMY: A REVIEW WITH
QUESTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 138 (3d ed. 2001) (“A vast amount of sensory
information (except smell) converges on the thalamus and is integrated through
the interconnections between the nuclei. The resulting information pattern is
distributed to other parts of the central nervous system.”).
50. Id. The cerebral cortex is “[a] sheet of densely packed neuronal cells
which form the outer, folded part of the brain associated with higher functions.”
FETAL AWARENESS, supra note 23, at vi.
51. PARLIAMENTARY OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., supra note 30, at 2.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 1 (stating the fibers of the thalamus “start developing at 17
weeks” yet do not “penetrate the cortical plate [of the cortex] to make permanent
connections . . . [until] 22–34 weeks”).
54. Id. at 2.
55. See MED. RESEARCH COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE MRC EXPERT GROUP ON
FETAL PAIN § 3.3 (2001), available at http://www.mrc.ac.uk/Utilities/Document
record/consumption/idcplg?IdcService=GET_FILE&dID=8049&dDocName=MR
C002413&allowInterrupt=1 (“Connections from the thalamus to the cortex begin
to form at about 20 weeks gestation . . . and continue to mature along with other
cortical connections well into childhood and adolescence.”).
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depends primarily upon the development and function of the
various regions of the brain. Although simple reflex responses are
observable even after only seven weeks of gestation, the brain is
not yet involved in the process.56 Without any brain activity,
there can be no perception of pain, according to the current
consensus of the medical community.57 But medical opinion
divides over whether the cortex exclusively controls the human
fetus’s perception of pain, or whether the thalamus and lower
brain stem can generate these perceptions.58
According to some physicians, the earlier development of the
thalamus and lower brain stem is sufficient for pain perception.59
Based on evidence obtained by observing anencephalic and
hydranencephalic infants who have no or minimal cortex
development, these experts assert that pain perception does not
depend upon established connections from the thalamus to the
cortex and can exist after the thalamus establishes its connection
with the sensory network60:
56.
57.

PARLIAMENTARY OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., supra note 30, at 1.
See COMM’N ON INQUIRY INTO FETAL SENTIENCE, HUMAN SENTIENCE
BEFORE BIRTH § 5.2 (1996), available at http://www.prolifeinfo.ie/am_cms_
media/uploaded/d/0e1625729_docacvpainhumansentience-before-birth.doc (“It is
commonly believed that without the cortex, the large mass of brain involved in
intricate decision-making, thought and controlled behaviour, there can be no
experience of pain.”).
58. See id. § 5.3
Professor Fitzgerald claimed that to challenge the idea that the cortex
was the only region of awareness would challenge “the very basis of
our understanding of the brain . . . [.] It is a basic acceptance of the
scientific and medical community that the cortex is the site of
experience, of understanding, of emotion, of interaction with the
outside world . . . . The cortex is what makes us into living, reacting,
individuals.” However, some scientists do challenge this thinking.
(omissions in original).
59. Id. § 5.3.2.
60. See id. § 5.3.1 (“[T]he evidence from such children challenges the
doctrine that the cortex is required for all conscious awareness. The possibility
is therefore increasing that the fetus could be aware and have consciousness
once lower structures in the brain are formed.”). “The thalamus (rather than the
sensory cortex) is thought to be the crucial structure for the perception of some
types of sensation, especially pain, and the sensory cortex may function to give
finer detail to the sensation.” STEPHEN G. WAXMAN, CORRELATIVE
NEUROANATOMY 125 (24th ed. 2000). This conclusion, although distinguishable,
is consistent with the statement of the American Academy of Pediatrics that
“[t]he decision [to administer anesthesia to neonates undergoing surgical
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Despite total or near-total absence of the cortex, these children
[with hydrocephaly] clearly possess discriminative awareness.
They distinguish familiar from unfamiliar people and
environments and are capable of social interaction, visual
orienting,
musical
preferences,
appropriate
affective
responses, and associative learning. . . .
Multiple lines of evidence thus corroborate that the key
mechanism of consciousness or conscious sensory perception
are not dependent on cortical activity. Consistent with this
evidence, the responses to noxious stimulation of children with
hydranencephaly are purposeful, coordinated, and similar to
those of intact children.61

Because the thalamus connection to the sensory network can be
established as early as twelve weeks of gestation, some experts
would date possible pain perception at twelve to thirteen weeks.62
Other physicians argue that the cortex–thalamus connection
is necessary to experience pain.63 Since this connection is
established at the earliest between twenty and twenty-four weeks
of gestation, these experts assert that only those fetuses of twenty
or more weeks of gestation can experience pain.64
procedures] should not be based solely on the infant’s age or perceived degree of
cortical maturity.” Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Neonatal Anesthesia, 80 PEDIATRICS
446, 446 (1987), available at http://www.aap.org/policy/01730.html.
61. Int’l Ass’n for the Study of Pain, Fetal Pain?, 14 PAIN: CLINICAL
UPDATES 1, 2 (2006).
62. See COMM’N ON INQUIRY INTO FETAL SENTIENCE, supra note 57, § 8.1. See
also Mary Sheridan & Roger Highfield, Growing Pains, LONDON TELEGRAPH
(Oct. 12, 2000, 12:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/sciencenews/4754496/Growing-pains.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2014) (reporting that
80% of British neuroscientists responding to a survey believed that the fetus
should receive pain control after eleven weeks of gestation) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
63. See Lee et al., supra note 23, at 952 (“While the presence of
thalamocortical fibers is necessary for pain perception, their mere presence is
insufficient—this pathway must also be functional.”).
64. Id.; see also Derbyshire & Furedi, supra note 25, at 912 (stating that
the “neuroanatomical system for pain can be considered complete by 26 weeks
gestation”); David J. Mellor et al., The Importance of “Awareness” for
Understanding Fetal Pain, 49 BRAIN RES. REV. 455, 456 (2005) (“[T]he final
critical cortico-thalamic connections appear to be present by 24–28 weeks of
gestation. This suggests that the fetus could potentially be able to feel pain by
the third trimester, at least in a rudimentary fashion.” (footnotes omitted));
Richard P. Smith et al., Pain and Stress in the Human Fetus, 92 EURO. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY & REPROD. BIOLOGY 161, 161–62 (2001) (noting the
neuroanatomical pathways necessary to feel pain begin to develop at 22 weeks,
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State legislatures throughout the country have waded into
the debate between physicians and scientists over these
questions, with thirteen states concluding that there is
substantial medical evidence that the unborn can feel pain and
that abortion should be strictly limited at and after twenty weeks’
gestation.65 Courts are now considering whether such legislative
conclusions provide an adequate basis for statutory bans on
abortions at twenty weeks’ gestation and later.66 In Gonzales v.
Carhart,67 the majority noted “[m]edical uncertainty does not
foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the abortion context
any more than it does in other contexts.”68 In light of the
Supreme Court’s treatment of congressional findings regarding
the partial-birth abortion procedure in Gonzales, it seems likely
the laws will be upheld.69
IV. Federal Constitutional Analysis of Abortion Regulation
In Roe v. Wade,70 the Supreme Court declared that the
Constitution contained an implicit right to obtain an abortion.71
The Court characterized the right as the logical extension of
another implied right—the right to use contraception—which was
grounded in the implied right to privacy.72 In so holding, however,
the Court recognized that the abortion decision was unique:
As we have intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate
for a State to decide that at some point in time another
interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential
human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman’s
and are complete at 26 weeks).
65. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (listing the thirteen state
statutes).
66. See, e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing a federal
court decision that addressed a state’s fetal pain statute).
67. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
68. Id. at 129.
69. See generally Antony B. Kolenc, Easing Abortion’s Pain: Can Fetal Pain
Legislation Survive the New Judicial Scrutiny of Legislative Fact-Finding?, 10
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 171 (2005).
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71. Id. at 153.
72. Id. at 152.
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privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses
must be measured accordingly.73

Unlike contraception, abortion involves both the mother and “a
whole, separate, unique, living human being” that she carries.74
Roe established what was to become a “rigid trimester
analysis,” permitting virtually no regulation of abortion during
the first trimester, and regulations directed only at preserving
maternal health in the second trimester.75 The state could protect
unborn human life by prohibiting abortions only in the third
trimester after the child was “viable” or capable of living outside
the womb,76 and then only if the abortion was not necessary to
preserve the life or the health of the mother.77
This trimester approach to abortion legislation was criticized
by four members of the Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services78:
We think that the doubt cast upon the Missouri statute by
these cases is not so much a flaw in the statute as it is a
reflection of the fact that the rigid trimester analysis of the
course of a pregnancy enunciated in Roe has resulted in
subsequent cases like Colautti and Akron making
constitutional law in this area a virtual Procrustean bed.79

73. Id. at 159.
74. See Planned Parenthood v. Rounds Minn., N.D., S.D., 530 F.3d 724, 735
(8th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (upholding a South Dakota law requiring that women
be informed that abortion ends the “life of a whole, separate, unique, living
human being,” and finding that opponents of the definition provided “no
evidence to the contrary”).
75. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 517 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
76. A viable fetus is “potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb,
albeit with artificial aid,” and presumably capable of “meaningful life outside
the mother’s womb.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160–63 (1973); see also Colautti
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388 (1979) (“Viability is reached when, in the
judgment of the attending physician on the particular facts of the case before
him, there is a reasonable likelihood of the fetus’ sustained survival outside the
womb, with or without artificial support.”). Medical authorities most commonly
place viability between twenty-two and twenty-six weeks gestation. MS
Pignotti, The Definition of Human Viability: A Historical Perspective, 99 ACTA
PAEDIATRICA 33, 35 (2010).
77. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64.
78. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
79. Id. at 517.
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The plurality opinion recognized that the State’s interest in
protecting fetal life existed throughout the pregnancy: “[W]e do
not see why the State’s interest in protecting potential human life
should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that
there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation
after viability but prohibiting it before viability.”80
Ultimately the trimester approach was rejected by the Court
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,81
because the trimester framework “misconceives the nature of the
pregnant woman’s interest; and in practice it undervalues the
State’s interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe.”82 The
Justices, however, retained fetal viability as a measure of
constitutional significance.83
To date, most cases regarding the ability of states to prohibit
abortions after viability have focused on the method of
determining viability.84 The existence of this rule, and the Court’s
acceptance of the state’s compelling interest in protecting viable
unborn children, however, does not foreclose the establishment of
a separate and independent state interest in preserving the lives
of unborn children at the point when they are capable of feeling
pain.
V. Fetal Pain as an Independent State Interest
The Supreme Court has never been asked whether the state’s
interest in protecting unborn children who have the capacity to
feel pain is sufficiently compelling to support a limited
prohibition on abortion. Challenges to Pain-Capable Child
Protection Acts require courts to determine whether the capacity
80. Id. at 519.
81. 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992).
82. Id. at 873.
83. See id. at 879 (“[A] State may not prohibit any woman from making the
ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”).
84. See, e.g., Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051,
1077 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (“[I]t appears that the physician cannot rely solely on his
or her own best clinical judgment in determining whether a fetus is viable;
instead, that determination must be objectively reasonable as well, that is,
reasonable to other physicians, as well as to the physician making the
determination.” (footnote omitted)).
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to feel pain, independent of fetal viability, is sufficient to sustain
a limited prohibition on abortion. While opponents argue
vigorously that the pain capacity of the previable unborn should
be legally irrelevant,85 there are several indications by various
members of the Supreme Court that suggest the limited
protection afforded to pain-capable unborn children may be
constitutional.86
Just as the issue of abortion deeply divides the American
people, abortion cases divide the Supreme Court, with many of
the most significant rulings being plurality opinions. Among the
most prominent examples are the plurality opinions in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services87 and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.88 Recent abortion cases such
as Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart suggest a growing willingness
of the Court to recognize and weigh multiple state interests in
assessing the constitutionality of an abortion regulation.
In Stenberg v. Carhart,89 Justice Kennedy emphasized that
Casey held it was “inappropriate for the Judicial Branch to
provide an exhaustive list of state interests implicated by
abortion” and that “Casey is premised on the states having an
important constitutional role in defining their interests in the
abortion debate.”90 In Gonzales, Justice Kennedy described the
state’s interest in the protection of fetal life as substantial at all
points: “Casey struck a balance that was central to its holding,
and the Court applies Casey’s standard here. A central premise of
Casey’s joint opinion . . . [is] that the government has a

85. Brief for American Colleges of Obstetricians & Gynecologists &
American Congress of Obstetricians & Gynecologists as Amici Curiae
Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3–4, Isaacson v. Horne, 884 F. Supp. 2d 961
(D. Ariz. 2012), rev’d, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013).
86. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 778 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he State’s interest in the
protection of an embryo . . . increases progressively and dramatically as the
organism’s capacity to feel pains, to experience pleasure, to survive, and to react
to its surroundings increases day by day.”).
87. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
88. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
89. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
90. Id. at 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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legitimate, substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal
life . . . .”91
In Gonzales, the Court upheld the federal Partial Birth
Abortion Ban Act, which made no distinction based on viability:
“The Act does apply both previability and postviability because,
by common understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a
living organism while within the womb, whether or not it is
viable outside the womb.”92 Justice Kennedy, author of the
majority opinion, emphasized the State’s interest in protecting
the fetus: “Casey struck a balance that was central to its holding,
and the Court applies Casey’s standard here. A central premise of
Casey’s joint opinion . . . [is] that the government has a
legitimate, substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal
life . . . .”93
Recognition of a compelling state interest in the protection of
pain-capable unborn children does not require the Court to reject
a woman’s liberty interest in obtaining an abortion or the
balancing framework of Casey—it only asks the Court to
recognize the legislature’s ability to weigh and rely upon new
scientific evidence supporting a strong state interest in regulating
abortions at twenty weeks’ gestation. Even former U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Stevens, who during his tenure on the Court
repeatedly voted to strike down abortion regulations, listed the
“organism’s capacity to feel pain” as a ground on the basis of
which “the State’s interest in the protection of an embryo . . .
increases progressively and dramatically.”94 He noted that “[t]he
development of a fetus—and pregnancy itself—are not static
conditions, and the assertion that the government’s interest is
static simply ignores this reality.”95
These statements all suggest possible movement away from
viability as the sole constitutional marker of legislative power to
limit abortions, and toward a more nuanced and balanced

91. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 126 (2007).
92. Id. at 147.
93. Id. at 126.
94. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 778 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 778.
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approach that would include consideration of the unborn child’s
pain.
VI. Responding to the Claim that Late Abortions Are Too Few to
Be of Concern
Some opponents of Pain-Capable Child Protection Acts argue
that the legislation is unnecessary given the small percentage of
abortions occurring after the first trimester of pregnancy.96 While
it is true that the percentage of abortions occurring at or after
twenty weeks in the pregnancy is relatively small,97 the issue is
not insignificant. Twenty-three percent of all abortion providers
in the United States offer abortions at twenty weeks.98 In 2009, of
the 1.21 million abortions performed in the United States, more
than 18,000 were performed after twenty-one weeks’ gestation.99
In any context other than abortion, 18,000 lost lives would
generate massive federal and state efforts to prevent these
deaths. Two examples illustrate this point. An estimated 15,529
people with an AIDS diagnosis died in 2010.100 In that same year
the federal government spent $19.6 billion for HIV/AIDS care,
housing, prevention, and research.101 For 2014 the President
proposed to increase domestic HIV/AIDS funding to $23.2
billion.102

96.
97.

Engelman, supra note 11, at 311.
See GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED
STATES 2 (2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf
(reporting that 1.2% of all abortions in 2010 were performed at or after twentyone weeks gestation).
98. Id.
99. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (describing the low
percentage of abortions performed after twenty-one weeks gestation).
100. HIV in the United States: At a Glance, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/statistics/basics/ataglance.html
(last
updated Dec. 3, 2013) (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
101. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FACT SHEET: U.S. FEDERAL
FUNDING FOR HIV/AIDS: THE PRESIDENT’S FY 2014 BUDGET REQUEST tbl.1 (2013),
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/7029-tables-1-2-feder
al-funding-for-hivaids-the-presidents-fy2014-budget-request.pdf.
102. Id.
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Drunk driving laws and government prevention programs
provide another example of substantial government efforts to
save a small number of lives. According to the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 10,322 people were killed in
alcohol-impaired-driving crashes in 2012.103 Federal and state
laws criminalize alcohol-impaired driving and state participation
in federal transportation funding is conditioned upon various
educational and enforcement efforts to prevent these deaths.104
Many Americans believe that saving 18,000 unborn children
from pain is as important as saving the 15,000 AIDS patients or
the 10,000 victims of drunk driving, and well worth the effort to
pass, enforce, and defend Pain-Capable Child Protection Acts.105
VII. Conclusion
If there is a single issue in the abortion debate where
common ground could be found, one would hope it might be on
the issue of protecting the unborn from the pain of abortion by
limiting abortions at twenty weeks or later to cases in which the
mother’s life or physical health is at stake. Legislatures in
thirteen states have enacted laws that say that babies cannot be
103. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: 2012
DATA 1 (2013), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811870.pdf.
104. See, e.g., Drunk Drivers: Congress Gets Behind Breath-Test Ignition
Devices, NATION NOW (Jan. 31, 2012, 3.28 PM), http://latimesblogs.
latimes.com/nationnow/2012/01/bill-to-target-drunk-drivers-gains-support-butother-battles-lay-ahead-over-next-roads-measure-.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2014) (“A House transportation bill unveiled Tuesday would offer additional
highway funds to states that require ignition interlock devices for DUI
offenders.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
105. See Dave Andrusko, Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act
Remains National Right to Life’s Top Legislative Priority, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE
NEWS TODAY, http://www.nationalrighttolifenews.org/news/2014/01/pain-cap
able-unborn-child-protection-act-remains-national-right-to-lifes-top-legislativepriority/#.UuKAJBb0Ay4 (last updated Jan. 14, 2014) (last visited Jan. 24,
2014)
In a nationwide poll of 1,003 registered voters in March, The Polling
Company found that 64% would support a law such as the PainCapable Unborn Child Protection Act prohibiting abortion after 20
weeks—when an unborn baby can feel pain—unless the life of the
mother is in danger. Only 30% opposed such legislation.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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aborted from the point that substantial medical evidence
demonstrates the child can feel pain—twenty weeks.106 PainCapable Child Protection Acts are innovative only insofar as the
legislation relies upon scientific evidence establishing the unborn
child’s capacity to feel pain at twenty weeks’ gestation and
concludes that the acquisition of this capacity makes that child
sufficiently like the rest of us to mark a tipping point—a tipping
point at which it becomes constitutional for states to restrict
abortion to cases involving pregnancies that pose a threat to the
mother’s life or substantial impairment of a major bodily
function. The evidence of the unborn child’s pain was not
available to the U.S. Supreme Court when it created the
constitutional right to abortion in 1973. Both pro-life and prochoice justices have acknowledged the relevance of pain in
adjudicating abortion cases.107 It is time for the Court to review
the evidence and adjust its constitutional jurisprudence to reflect
the medical reality of fetal pain and respect the state’s right to
intervene and protect the child.

106. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (listing the thirteen state
statutes).
107. See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text (discussing opinions of
Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens).

